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Abstract 
The processes of structural change and modernisation in the food distribution industry 
have been submitted to different economic and institutional frameworks in European 
countries. Two essential factors have affected these changes: on one hand, the role of 
technical, financial and organisational innovations and on the other, institutional factors. 
The weight of both has varied depending on the historical circumstances of the 
countries in consideration and their level of development.   
This paper discusses with the framework of the “latecomers”. In these countries, the 
factor of innovation has been produced in terms of appropriation, whether this is 
technological or organisational, usually influenced by foreign models or through direct 
foreign investment. The impact of these innovations has been highly conditioned by 
inflexible institutional surroundings.  
Considering the Spanish food trade in the last sixty years is a good way of dealing with 
the processes of structural change in Mediterranean Europe. This paper helps one 
understand the role taken by countries which introduced factors of innovation and 
growth in less favourable surroundings than those of developed Europe. 
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1. Introduction 
The processes of structural change and modernisation in the retail trade industry have 
been subject to different economic and institutional frameworks in European countries. 
Two essential factors have affected these changes: on one hand, the role of technical, 
financial and organisational innovations and on the other, institutional factors. The 
weight of both has varied depending on the historical circumstances of the countries in 
consideration and their level of development. 
The history of retailing has grown as it has developed over the last decade.2 Some 
previous factors, such as the attention aroused by the history of consumption in the UK, 
generated a new interest in retailing (Fraser 1981, Gardner 1989, Benson 1994, Benson, 
Ugolini 2003).  Works with complementary visions of retailing which maintain a 
basically historical perspective developed progressively (Alexander, Akehurst 1998, 
Bowlby 2000, Coles 1999, Alexander, Nell et al. 2009). In this sense, the role of 
innovation has been dealt with by numerous disciplines such as retail management, 
retail geography and business history itself. (Alexander, Shaw et al. 2005) pointed out 
the need to keep in mind the role of the processes of knowledge management and 
learning within the company when considering the processes of innovation in retailing. 
They are part of a group of authors who focused their attention on the key factors of 
technical and organisational change, starting from marketing assumptions or strategic 
management. This includes (Burt 1991, Burt 1993, Davies, Fergusson 1995) who 
understand international retailing as a manifestation of the consumer society after the 
boom of the sixties. Likewise, we must consider the works about the diffusion of 
innovation in retail, which, during the critical period of the thirties to 1965, turned 
around self-service establishments and supermarkets, especially in British cases 
(Alexander, A., Benson, J., Shaw 1999, Shaw, Curth et al. 2004, Shaw, Alexander 2006, 
                                                            
1 The first author acknowledges the financial support from an MEC grant (Ministry of Economy and 
Competitiveness) (Award number HAR2010‐18544, sub programme HIST). The second author also 
acknowledges MEC support (ECO2012‐35266). The usual caveats apply. 
2 See the literature review by ALEXANDER, N., 2011. British overseas retailing, 1900‐60: International 
firm characteristics, market selections and entry modes. Business History, 53(4), pp. 530‐556 
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Shaw, Alexander 2008, Alexander 2008), French cases (Lescent-Giles 2002) and 
German cases (Schröter 2008). This literature has points in common with a number of 
studies that have addressed the diffusion of innovations and technological and 
knowledge transfers after the Second World War often framed as “Americanization” 
(Kipping, Bjarnar 1998, Zeitlin 2000). Finally, under the viewpoint of the spread of 
innovation, both the concept of technological adoption (Rogers 2003), and the process 
of Americanisation led to this relevant focus. This point of view refers to the concept of 
appropriation which has an interesting “journey” in social and historical science, an 
approximation which emphasises the role played by the recipient of the innovation with 
greater intensity, considering it beyond its condition of a simple user (Nolan 1994, 
Eglash, Croissant et al. 2004, Alberts 2010).  
In institutional terms, there are different approximations. Maybe those which are 
most interesting to highlight in this paper refer to the function of regulatory 
surroundings, the structures of the domestic market and foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Significant advances have been made in the field of international retailing on the 
knowledge of retailing in the framework of first and second globalisation (Godley 2003, 
Alexander 2011, Fletcher, Godley 2000, Godley, Fletcher 2000, Godley, Fletcher 
2001).3 Clearly in retailing, we should not only consider relationships between issuers 
and recipients of investment, i.e. the basic conditions of the chosen market. We must 
also consider such important elements as regulation in domestic markets (Morris 1998, 
Morris 1999, Shaw, Alexander et al. 2000) or in both sides of the movement of capital, 
both in the issuing country and the receiving one (Klopstock 1973, Cho 1985). This is 
what some investigators have called receptivity (Tschoegl 1987). With this term, used 
mainly for bank investments, we mean the level of openness of an economic recipient 
(Walter, Gray 1983). This focus suggests that, long term, countries with few 
comparative advantages in international markets (which often coincide with countries of 
belated industrialisation), will tend to enact laws which protect their market. This is a 
factor to take into account when we adopt a viewpoint which also considers less 
developed countries.  
                                                            
3 On the role of international retailing at global level, see the debate: GODLEY, A. and HANG, H., 2012. 
Globalisation and the evolution of international retailing: A comment on Alexander's 'British overseas 
retailing, 1900‐1960'. Business History, 54(4), pp. 529‐541, and ALEXANDER, N., 2013. Retailing in 
international markets, 1900‐2010: A response to Godley and Hang's "Globalisation and the evolution of 
international retailing: A comment on Alexander's "British overseas retailing, 1900‐1960"'. Business 
History, 55(2), pp. 302‐312 
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The international retail management theory provides a very useful analytical 
framework, dealing with strategic aspects and motivations of retailing businesses in 
their processes of internalisation (Salmon, Tordjman 1989, Treadgold 1988, Burt 1991). 
In fact, there has been recurring research which adapted modern theories on 
internationalisation to the retail industry (Pellegrini 1994) and (Dunning 2001), the 
latter from an economic and international business theory. Nevertheless, some 
reservations have been expressed since the characteristics of commerce mean that the 
advantages of ownership and also internationalisation, alongside innovation, are easily 
imitable and do not have as much importance as the advantages of localisation. (Burt 
1991: 490). (Dawson 1994, Dawson 2007) abound in this scepticism by considering the 
difficulties of exporting services linked to commerce. To summarise, these 
methodological approximations, without doubt very useful, suffered however sufficient 
temporal depth. Consequently, approximation which emphasises the historical point of 
view, (that of economic and business history and an interdisciplinary point of view) will 
generally favour the deepening nature of retailing (see Alexander, Akehurst 1998, 
Buckley 2009). 
This paper discusses this within the framework of the “latecomers” and the 
historical perspective. In these countries, the factor of innovation has been produced in 
terms of appropriation, whether this is technological or organisational, usually 
influenced by foreign models or through FDI. The impact of these innovations has been 
highly conditioned by inflexible institutional surroundings. Considering the Spanish 
food trade over the last sixty years is an excellent framework for dealing with the 
processes of structural change in Mediterranean Europe. This paper helps us understand 
the role taken by countries which introduced factors of innovation and growth in less 
favourable surroundings than those of developed Europe. These changes occurred in 
Spain despite institutional obstacles, such as the interventionist practices of the Franco 
regime between 1940 and 1974, policies from local and regional authorities from 1975 
which the market considered unfavourable and finally, some European Union proposals. 
These obstacles could be overcome thanks to foreign influence (Americanisation and 
Europeanisation), via programmes of cooperation (US, in the 1950s) or through 
European investments (especially from the 1970s). In this respect, the innovation 
deployed was the competitive locomotive which permitted the modernisation and 
structural change of Spanish food distribution. 
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The period studied spans two stages. The first, from 1950 to 1971, was marked by 
the transition between the first and second globalisation whereby the British model was 
abandoned in international retailing and a model structured around the formats of self-
service and the supermarket in domestic markets was progressively adopted (Godley 
2003, Alexander 2011).  This current was introduced in Spain in the second half of the 
nineteen fifties through native initiatives which were strongly supported by currents of 
external dissemination, although it did not start to be really effective until the start of 
the following decade (Maixé-Altés 2009). The second phase falls under the impetus of 
the second globalisation which had an impact on world economy in the nineteen 
eighties and nineties. In this stage, Spanish food retailing experienced the strong 
influence of the general currents linked to the FDI in retailing, which were a real 
salutary lesson for the domestic market (Castro 2010). 
Primary sources from Spanish national and foreign archives related to foreign 
investment have been used as has corporative documentation from supermarket chains, 
voluntary chains and multinational superstores. Similarly, the press and business 
publications, Spanish distribution annual directories and interviews with people 
especially involved in management processes and modernisation have been used as a 
documentary basis for this work. 
In the second section, we will study the conditions of the late installation of modern 
food distribution in Spain, considering the intense and varied foreign influences, the 
role of native agents and the limits of an institutional framework. Next, we will deal 
with the strong structural change and the salutary lesson which meant the premature 
arrival of direct French investment at the start of the seventies. The fourth section will 
directly discuss the establishment of foreign investment and the consequences of entry 
into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986, which placed the Spanish 
retail market directly in a second globalisation, a situation which at the end of the 
century, was marked by the arrival of new foreign models and strong concentration in 
the whole of the sector. Finally, we will draft out some conclusions.  
 
2. The early years of Spanish food distribution, 1950-1971 
There is first macroeconomic evidence of the Spanish delay in comparison with retail 
distribution systems which contemporaneously existed in developed Europe, which 
provides us with national Spanish accountability. Between 1945 and 1951, the private 
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consumption of food, drink and tobacco grew as a proportion of GDP until it reached 
practically 50 per cent. From this date onwards, in only five years, the ratio fell 14 
percentage points, indicating what would be the historical trend: between 1960 and 
1995, this percentage reduced to a third, producing in those 35 years the progressive 
convergence with the European average (Prados de la Escosura 2003, Uriel Jiménez, 
Moltó et al. 2000).4 The following evidence is seen in Table 1. In 1959, Spain, along 
with Italy and Ireland, found itself amongst the countries of Europe whose self –service 
had less presence in the retail food trade.  
Table 1. Self-service in Europe, 1959 (inhabitants per retail outlet) 
Early adopters Sweden 1 564
Norway 2 043
Germany 3 194
Switzerland 4 039
Holland 6 259
Denmark 6 977
UK 8 883
In transition Austria 15 618
France 26 759
Belgium 32 400
Late adopters  Ireland 93 000
Spain 97 000
Italy 180 000
Source: Sparco 11 (1960), p. 3. 
The reasons for this delay need to be sought out in the poor modernisation of retail 
during the interwar period (see Maixé-Altés 2009), but above all in the weak income per 
capita of Spanish economy and the economic and social disruption between the Civil 
War (1936-1939). In fact, international isolation of General Franco’s regime and his 
politics of extreme autarchy led the country to total poverty immediately in the post-war 
period (Guirao 1998, Barciela, López Ortiz 2003). In this context, institutional 
surroundings were produced which were very distant from the market; some guidelines, 
both from the sides of offer and demand, characteristic of a country which was not very 
industrialised except from some regional areas and cities with greater urban density 
(Maixé-Altés 2009). The period between 1940 and 1952 was period of more than a 
decade lost for Spanish distribution. The aims of the governmental regulation were to 
check rationing systems (creation of the General Commissariat of Supply and Shipping, 
CAT in its Spanish abbreviation, Act 10 March 1939).  Consequently, corruption grew 
                                                            
4 Ministry of Trade and Tourism, Working Paper. General report on domestic trade in Spain, June 1978. 
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as did the black market (in Spanish, estraperlo),5 in a framework of shortage of offers 
and products with prices set by the government. On one hand, the industry was not 
suitable for the modern methods of distribution, for example, most foods were handled 
lavishly and the packing systems were manual. On the other, the culture of consumers 
and retailing practices responded to archaic guidelines which were obsolete in a 
developed Europe6. In these years, the conditions for modern marketing and retailing 
practices in Spain were simply not given. The shortage of modernised business forums, 
the lack of teaching institutions, all in all, the isolation of autarchy did not favour the 
creation of a framework which would incentivise changing structures in the retail sector. 
(Garcia Ruiz 2007, Puig 2003, Maixé-Altés 2009). This situation distanced Spain from 
the framework in which the European retail sector was developing (Shaw, Curth et al. 
2004, Shaw, Alexander 2008). 
There were three influential currents which removed the obsolete autarchic 
framework and mobilised short and long term changes in the Spanish food trade: the 
implementation of North American aid within the US Technical Assistance and 
Productivity Programme (USTAPP) of the ERP from 1951, the influence of European 
retailing, focused on the presence of some voluntary chains and finally the influence of 
some Latin American businessmen (Cubans and Mexicans), who emigrated to Spain in 
the post war period and set up shops inspired by North American retail (Maixé-Altés 
2009).  
The first signs of opening began with the approval during the Truman 
administration of the amendment in favour of Spain which led to the arrival of North 
American aid. The signature of the Pact of Madrid between Spanish and North 
American administration in September 1953, created an institutional framework which 
favoured the recuperation of business expectations (Viñas 1981, Calvo 2001). The tool 
of this policy was the Spanish Productivity Council, Comisión Nacional de 
Productividad Industrial (CNPI), which began its activity in the first months of 1953 
thanks to extraordinary credit approved by the Cortes, Franco’s legislative body.7 It 
followed the model underway in the group of European countries which were subject to 
                                                            
5 The word estraperlo was introduced into Spanish vocabulary as a result of an economic/political 
scandal at the time of the Second Republic, 1935. It comes from the acronym of its protagonists: Strauss 
(which is pronounced eStrauss), Perle and Lowan. 
6 Interview with Álvaro Ortiz de Zarate, Madrid, 25 February 2010. 
7 Archives of the Cámara de Comercio de Madrid (ACCM) [Chamber of Commerce of Madrid], Memoires 
of the CNPI, 1953 and 1954. 
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the European Productivity Agency (Alexander, Phillips et al. 2008). After the 
implementation of the productivity programmes in the industry, at the heart of the 
commission, an idea to create a specific programme to promote the modern techniques 
of commercial distribution (especially in the field of food distribution), arose.8 Priority 
was given to self-service and the implementation of this programme began in 1956 with 
the participation of three institutions: the CNPI, the Madrid Chamber of Commerce and 
the Ministry of Commerce.9  
In the first place, the CNPI managed to send various teams to the United States and 
Europe on study trips (1956-1958) with the participation of 57 specialists and 
businessmen. This line of action was complemented by the technical exchange 
programmes with Europe which implemented two campaigns: one directed to food 
consultants (Denmark, German Federal Republic and France) and another related to the 
European teaching programmes on food (Sweden, Norway and Denmark). Additionally, 
there were campaigns on dissemination, publishing and contracting foreign specialists 
to train local executives.10 Secondly, the Madrid Chamber of Commerce, through its 
productivity office, collaborator of the CNPI, organised numerous cycles of conferences 
and courses on promoting self-services. This office was directed by Alvaro Ortiz de 
Zárate and the North American technician August W. Swentor, both becoming real 
promoters of self-service for the cities and villages of Spain in those years.11 
Simultaneously, an advice office was created, directed to businesses over the entire 
national territory and finally, in April 1958, an exhibition on self-service in Spain 
(including a pilot supermarket) came into being.12 Thirdly, the Ministry of Commerce, 
through the CAT, installed a public network of supermarkets throughout Spain “with 
                                                            
8 ACCM, Report on self‐service in Spain, 1957‐1960. 
9 ACCM, Memoires of the CNPI, 1953‐1956. 
10 CNPI, La distribución de Alimentos en España, Madrid, 1959. 
11 A. Ortiz de Zárate was a collaborator of the US Secretary of State as an interpreter and assessor for 
technical Exchange trips from Spain to the USA  (1956‐1957); member of the Comisión Nacional de 
Productividad Industrial, CNPI, [National Commission of Industrial Productivity] and of the Chamber of 
Commerce of Madrid; founder of the Marketing Club of Madrid and general director of SPAR Española 
(1959‐1970); FAO consultant for Africa and Latin America in the seventies and Director General of 
Mercajerez, 1981‐1985 (interview Ortiz de Zárate, 2010). A.W. Swentor, the specialist in self‐services 
and supermarkets, arrived in Spain in March 1957 as a member of the International Cooperation 
Administration (ICA), established in 1955 by the North American Department of State. He was sales 
director in Canada of the Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., between 1952 and 1957 visited 12 European 
countries as an assessor of retail distribution and his works were published by the OEEC (CNPI, La 
distribución, Madrid, 1959. Interview with Ortiz de Zárate, 2010). 
12 ACCM, Report, 1957‐1960 and CNPI, La distribución, Madrid, 1959. 
9 
 
the aim to stimulate private initiative and incite the transformation into traditional 
traders”.13 
Some North American corporations collaborated with the institutions mentioned. Of 
note is the multinational National Cash Register (NCR), a firm specialised in the 
manufacture and distribution of teams to sell to retail and the finance industry. These 
were the promoters of the NARGUS films, directed to retail sales training courses 
(translated into Spanish).14 The corporation supported a specialised school in the 
Central of  NCR in Dayton (Ohio), which became an international reference point on 
the models of the development of self-service and supermarkets (Bowlby 2000, 
Alexander, Shaw et al. 2005). Spanish technicians, familiarised with the NCR’s 
teaching resources, had the chance for contact in Germany which was then considered 
the international “authority” on the subjects of self-service and supermarkets. This was 
the Columbian Bernardo Trujillo, who worked in Dayton and who in 1958 ended up 
teaching a course in Germany.15 
The second current which eliminated such a restrictive cultural and institutional 
frame was the influence of European retailing. The pioneer of this trend was the arrival 
in 1959 of a foreign voluntary grocery wholesaler like the Dutch Spar. This was the first 
entrance of a European group and Spanish businessmen’s first contact of food 
distribution with European businesses (Maixé-Altés 2009). The arrival of Spar must not 
be interpreted as an FDI, but rather a transfer of knowledge. In fact, foreign capital was 
not interested in the Spanish market until the seventies, with the exception of some 
attempts by French capital in the sixties as we will see later on (Castro 2010, Maixé-
Altés 2009).  
The process which Spar followed in Spain is a paradigm of the situation in countries 
which were very far behind as regards the food trade. The Spar movement was very 
well received by a group of Spanish businessmen from the distribution sector. Some of 
the members of this group were linked to the CNPI’s initiatives and the visits to Europe, 
where they had their first contacts with representatives from Spar Europe. Thus Spar 
Española SA was born, integrated by Spanish partners which in 1960 already had 31 
distribution centres which served 2,227 retail establishments and 70 per cent of Spanish 
                                                            
13 ACCM, Report, 1957‐1960. Between 1958 and 1959, eight supermarkets were set up in the large 
cities. In 1970, these were present in 14 cities with a total of 20 establishments (CAT, Guía nacional de 
establecimientos de autoservicios de alimentación, Valladolid, 1971). 
14 Interview Ortiz de Zarate, 2010. 
15 Ibid. CNPI, La distribución de Alimentos, 1959 and (Castro 2010). 
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territory (Maixé-Altés 2009).16 The reasons why these businessmen got excited over 
this franchise was because they considered it a tool within reach of many small and 
medium-sized businesses, short of capital, but very aware of the necessary 
modernisation of the Spanish food distribution and the business opportunities it offered. 
During this stage, they were the most effective tool in transferring knowledge to the 
business sector, especially due to the huge capacity for technical and professional 
training which its collaborative structures could offer their associates (Maixé-Altés 
2009). 
A third current which could be considered as the most widespread was the presence 
of some Cuban businessmen, exiled after the Castro revolution and some Mexican 
family firms who extended their business to Spain. This emigrants knew the North 
American model very well (Moreno Lázaro 2012). Amongst Cuban repatriates, Cesar 
Rodríguez, José Fernández and Ramón Areces stand out, being key men in the 
development of two important department store chains: Galerías Preciados and El Corte 
Inglés (Toboso 2001, Toboso 2007, Cuartas 2005). Another familiar Spanish-Cuban 
group which returned to Spain after the Castro revolution was the creator of SIMAGO, 
the main chain of popular department stores of the sixties and seventies (José M. 
Mayorga, his cousin Valeriano López and both their wives, the Waddington sisters), 
(Castro 2010). Also some Mexican businessmen of Spanish origin who settled in Spain 
in the sixties: Jaime Jorba (Bimbo) and Plácido Arango (Aurreá Supermarkets), 
(Moreno Lázaro 2012, Moreno 2010, Maixé-Altés 2009). 
Without doubt, all these influential currents had a positive impact on such a 
collapsed sector as Spanish distribution. The increase in the income per capita between 
1960 and 1975, which between 1970 and 1975 had rate growths above the average of 
the developed counties of the previous decade, was another factor of economic 
dynamism (although the gross added value of commerce grew at a lower rate).17 
Nevertheless, the change processes were very slow. On governmental request, it was 
insisted that Spain become a mixed economy, in which the public sector played a 
fundamental role. However public initiatives were guided by criteria which were more 
interventionist than dynamic and, in many cases, private initiative lacked the necessary 
push. The Dirección General de Comercio Interior  [General Department of Internal 
                                                            
16  The voluntary chains were organised by independent retail and wholesale businessmen who worked 
together like partners. 
17 Contabilidad Nacional Española, INE, base 1970, Ministry of Trade and Tourism, General report, 1978 
and OECD Statistics. 
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Commerce], created in 1957, overlapped its functions and skills with the CAT. The 
result was the new general department had minimum advocacy in the rationalisation of 
commerce.18 Something similar occurred with the Law of Repression of Restrictive 
Practices of Competition of 1963 which created the Defence Court of Competition. 
Although it was inspired by articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, its influence was 
marginal in a regulatory framework where there was so much intervention.  The 
development of the legislation related to the Service of Discipline of the Market and 
competent autonomous bodies in price control merely contributed to increasing this 
regulatory web. All in all, an institutional tangle was generated which overlapped skills 
and hindered the actions of economic agents.  
This combination of circumstances explained the slow expansion of the new 
techniques of self-service and the supermarket in the sixties and start of the seventies. 
Between 1957 and 1960, the first years when self-service was introduced, 51.4 per cent 
of establishments were promoted by corporate business (multiple retailers), 30.7 per 
cent by independent businessmen and 17.8 per cent by consumer cooperatives.19 In 
total, 217 self-service establishments were opened, almost all between 1959 and 1960.20 
In the first half of the sixties, on average 282 new self-service establishments were 
created a year, 797 in the second half of the decade and in the first half of the seventies, 
the annual average grew to 1,011 establishments a year.21  
As the 1960s advanced, the leadership in creating new establishments was in the 
hands of the voluntary chains (Spar, Végé, CENTRA and Vivo) which due to their 
characteristics as a franchise, spanned the entire territory. In the first half of the 
seventies, there were presumably over two hundred central wholesale distributors, a 
sales surface which exceeded 600,000 square metres and about 62,000 associated 
retailers. In the field of cooperatives, at that time there were 88 institutions with 
approximately 12,000 associated retailers, although only four of these had over 400 
associates (IRESCO 1977, p. 48).  
In turn, there were many multiple retailers at the start of the decade but they still 
maintained a very local character with little protection in larger markets (Maixé-Altés 
2009), the only exceptions being SIMAGO and the chains of department stores (Castro 
2010, Gómez Mendoza 1984). The case of SIMAGO deserves special attention for two 
                                                            
18 CNPI, Memorias. CNPI, La distribución, 1959. 
19 ACCM, Report, 1957‐1960. 
20 Ibid. Ministerio de Comercio, Guía nacional de autoservicios de alimentación, 1974 and 1983. 
21 Ministerio de Comercio, Guía nacional de autoservicios de alimentación, 1974. 
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reasons: it was the first chain of popular stores at national reach which introduced a 
supermarket in its establishments and, moreover, it soon became the bridgehead of 
investments of French capital in Spanish distribution (Castro 2010, Castro 2011). In 
1963, three years after its creation, it had four establishments, some 3,500 square metres 
of sales surface (branches in Madrid, Santander, Oviedo and Gijón) and obvious 
problems of management.22 José M. Mayorga, president of the chain, chose to ask 
advice from a European leader of popular stores, the PRISUNIC chain (Caracalla, 
1989). The response was very positive and collaboration was implemented through a 
subsidiary of PRISUNIC, the consultancy firm Paul Planus. Jean Pierre Dollberg, 
consultant and advisor of the subsidiary of PRISUNIC, after a few months of study and 
faced with the company’s delicate financial situation, proposed a shock plan to get the 
accounts into shape and rationalise relations with the clients and suppliers of 
SIMAGO.23 In June 1963, the agreement between both parties was produced therefore 
French capital came into the company and French managers took charge of the strategic 
control of SIMAGO (Castro, 2010).24 
The new managers had to resort to all their experience in the sector to ensure the 
project was successful. In the words of Dollberg himself, “Knowing the future is 
terribly useful, we have saved a lot of time”.25 In fact, his team reached the conclusion 
that the Spanish market was some ten or fifteen years behind the French one. They once 
again experienced a step previously experienced by PRISUNIC in France, although it 
was exasperated by the particular idiosyncrasy of Spanish retail. 
The strategy followed by the new management team was the diversification and 
application of marketing techniques which were little known in Spain. The new group 
was made up of eight firms which spanned a wide range of activities.26 Its 
establishments had an average sales surface of 1,000 square metres and were divided in 
equal parts between bazaar and food, with some 1,500 references which maximised the 
brands themselves (SIMAGO and TAURO).27 Using techniques which had already been 
experienced in France, “everyone under the same roof”, the group introduced a soft 
discount, strengthening its support for fresh products. The strategic turn was a success: 
                                                            
22 Libre Service Actualítés (henceforth LSA) nº 470 (22 November 1973).  
23 LSA nº 470 (22 November 1973). Interview with Pierre Dollberg. 
24 Fondo Banco Urquijo (FBU) [Urquijo Bank Archive], SIMAGO Annual report (1963).  
25 LSA nº 470 (22 November 1973).  
26 SIMAGO, Grandes Almacenes Populares (GAPSA), PRISUMA, SICOMI, Restaurantes Técnicos, OGAMIS 
y HOGARAMA, Toboso (2002).  
27 FBU, SIMAGO Annual report (1974).  
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SIMAGO went from a 3,500 m2 sales surface in 1963 to almost 150,000 ten years later. 
28 
General statistics show that the retailing revolution had still not reached Spain when 
French hypermarkets arrived at the start of the seventies. Only 19 per cent of food 
establishments could be considered as self-services (DYM-PANEL 1973-1993). Within 
this category, 8,722 establishments were included, of which 78.5 per cent were self-
services (120 to 400 square metres) and 3 per cent supermarkets (over 400 square 
metres). All in all, at the start of the decade there were 7,300 inhabitants per self-
service, a ratio which was still a long way from the European average (CAT 1971).  
In conclusion, this data shows the strong lack of infrastructure and equipment of 
Spanish distribution. An intense small holding persisted in commercial establishments. 
The average number of persons employed by wholesale establishment was 3.68, 
significantly lower than in Europe (in France it was 8 people), while in retail 
establishments it was 2 employees, compared to 2.9 employees on average in France. 
Finally, commercial infrastructures did not adapt to the requirements of a modern 
business, as 70 per cent of commercial premises were over ten years old and 41 per cent 
were over 40 years old. (IRESCO 1978: 178-179, IRESCO 1983).  
 
3. FDI, a catalyst for Spanish Food Retailing in the 1970’s 
The arrival in Spain of the first FDI at the hand of French hypermarkets in the early 
years of the 1970’s found itself in a regulatory desert.  There was no specific regulation 
which gave them legal security and, even worse, was that criteria related to land 
management were not considered in legislation nor were the functional characteristics 
of commercial equipment of collective use.29 
During the second half of the seveties, in a context of intense institutional change 
caused by the arrival of democracy, the first steps were taken towards planning the 
domestic market although results were scarce. Decree 300/1978 designed a new 
framework for the management of commerce and the domestic market, accompanied by 
autonomous bodies such as the Institute for the Reform of Commercial Structures 
(IRESCO in its Spanish abbreviation) and the National Institute of Consumption. A 
reform, without doubt with good intentions but which did not adapt to the rapid changes 
which were occurring in the sector: the arrival of the FDI, territorial opening of the 
                                                            
28 LSA nº 1036 (12 September 1986). 
29 Ministry of Trade and Tourism, General report, June 1978. 
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multiple retailers and expansion and diversification of the department stores. The 
circumstances derived from the economic crisis conditioned the regulatory processes of 
the end of the seventies and most of the eighties. As a sample, we just need to quote that 
the Spanish domestic market at the start of the eighties was subject to the application of 
contingents, both products and factors of production (Barceló Vila 1981).  
The institutional conditions of the Spanish market implied certain advantages for 
new stores given that unlike most European countries, there were no restrictions to 
opening new establishments. French capital was aware it had to hurry up before the 
legislation became more restrictive. In the words of Dennis Defforey, co-founder of the 
French group Carrefour: “[…] stupidity is contagious”. He was clearly thinking about 
the consequences that 1973 French commercial legislation had for his shops.30 The 
presence of French capital in SIMAGO since 1963 had established the basis for French 
investors to be able to consider new projects at the start of the 1970’s, such as the 
incorporation of the concept of the French hypermarket in Spain. SIMAGO looked for 
French partners for this adventure: PRISUNIC and Euromarché which brought their 
know-how into the store. Later on, one of the greats of French and European 
distribution, Carrefour, incorporated itself into the Spanish market via a series of 
strategic alliances (Castro 2010). 
On 19 July 1973, the first hypermarket opened up in Spain in the locality of Prat de 
Llobregat, very near Barcelona, next to the motorway of the Mediterranean (access road 
of French tourism to the Spanish coast).31 Confirming forecasts, half of the clients were 
tourists in the first four months of opening of the new hipermarket. In October, the first 
Carrefour of the country opened up its doors, half a kilometre away from the first 
hypermarket, also very near the motorway. The entrance of the hypermarket promoted 
by SIMAGO precipitated Carrefour’s strategic decision, also interested in a market 
which was unedited like the Spanish one.32 It called attention to the fact that the entirety 
of the middle and top executives of the new centre were French.33  
After the first months, the activity of both surfaces declined and sales developed 
below expectations as a consequence of the accumulation of strategic errors (Lhermie 
                                                            
30 LSA nº 666 (21 April 1978): interview with Dennis Defforey on the results of the process of the 
internationalisation of Carrefour.  
31 Distribución Actualidad (DA) nº 43 (September).  
32 LSA nº 534 (24 April 1975).  
33 LSA nº 487 (4 April 1974). 
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2003, 35).34 Obviously, the economic crisis, accompanied by considerable peaks of 
inflation did not help.  However there was rashness as Marcel Fournier revealed with 
Carrefour.35 Market studies and clientele analysis were over optimistic. Carrefour tried 
to satisfy its popular classes. Nevertheless, in Spain in the seventies, the real clientele 
belonged to the upper middle class, a segment with access to motor cars and who were 
not willing to make purchases in warehouses (Sordet, Wantz 2005, 44). Spain was not a 
market which was as easy as French operators supposed. Effectively, there was no 
competition in the sector of hypermarkets but the culture of large surfaces did not exist 
and, moreover, in food distribution, competitors started to grow in modern formats of 
proximity. All in all, the capacity of Spanish clientele to adapt to the new current, 
including in Catalonia, had been over-estimated. There, presumably, its higher level of 
income should have been greater. Despite this, the agents implied were convinced of the 
future potential of the projects.36 In fact, between 1973 and 1976, seventeen projects of 
hypermarkets were activated, mainly located on the coast and supported by the 
Mediterranean motorways of which only ten were completed (See Table 2).37 
 
Table 2. Evolution of the openings of French hypermarkets in Spain, 1973- 2006 
Period Phase nº of 
openings 
total nº of 
hypermarkets  
Openings 
per year  
1973- 1976 Introduction 10 10 3.3 
1976- 1986 Generalisation 37 47 3.7 
1986- 1996 Maximum expansion 91 138 9.1 
1996- 2006 Saturation  55 194 5.5 
Source: Anuario de la Distribución, various editions. Castro (2010). 
 
In those years, Carrefour consolidated the objectives that, as a group, they had 
established previously in France: decentralisation and self-financing. Decentralisation 
involved each hypermarket, from the sections to the providers. This philosophy 
extended to the suppliers’ wage, they had to deliver the goods to centres and wait to be 
paid. The idiosyncrasies of pay to providers in Spain, 120 day payment terms, favoured 
the short term financing of the hypermarkets. Less than 15 per cent of the cost of the 11 
                                                            
34 DA nº14 (January 1976). See (Castro 2010). 
35 LSA nº 534 (24 April 1975), interview with Marcel Fournier. 
36 LSA nº 666 (21 April 1978). Interview with Dennis Defforey on the process of internationalisation of 
Carrefour in Spain and Brazil.   
37 Archives of the French Chamber of Commerce of Madrid, monthly bulletins various editions, 1973‐ 
1976). 
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new hypermarkets opened by Carrefour was financed by banking credit.38 Finally, to 
hispanicise the brand, the management of the holding company created a new brand, 
PRICA (an acronym of Precio y Calidad [Price and Quality]), taking up again the name 
of a chain of supermarkets of the sixties.39 
In 1976, another great name of French distribution arrived: Promodès. The French 
holding company carried out a detailed study of the market, based on prudence and 
knowledge of errors committed previously by its competitors (Castro 2010). Thus the 
first Continente hypermarket of the group in Alfafar (Valencia) was born. Its offer was 
directed to clientele with a high level of income. The results were stable and with less 
seasonality than its Carrefour predecessors.40 Its expansion policy was articulated on the 
urban nuclei of the Mediterranean coast and the access to the provincial capitals of the 
inner peninsular (Sordet, Wantz 2005, 46), as well as committing to a multi-formed 
culture from the nearest supermarket to the hypermarket.41  
In this sense, Promodès’ policy in France had been the soft-discount (Shopi, Banco 
or huitàhuit). Nevertheless, Paul-Louis Halley, the president of Promodès, wanted ti 
apply  in Spain the German hard-discount, based on a single brand offer and prices up to 
30 per cent below average (Sainz de Vicuña, Jose María 2001, 250). In 1979, the first 
DIA supermarket opened in Madrid, the result being a hybrid between the soft and hard-
discount: a smaller discount and an assortment of well-known brands in the market, but 
not over extensive (Sordet 1997, 286). A suitable franchising policy favoured the 
expansion of the political model, a policy which did not end there, as Promodès 
understood that the way to do business in Spain needed more diversification. Hence the 
Promotora de Centros Comerciales Centros Shopping came about in 1978, the creator 
of the first Spanish malls. Its impact was fundamental for the construction of the 
country’s first official commercial centre: Baricentro, which opened its doors in Barberá 
del Vallés (some 15 kilometres North of Barcelona), in April 1980.42  
This first advance in international investment in Spanish retail was characterised by 
some peculiarities. On one hand, the absence of regulation in the domestic market 
which favoured entry (despite the fact that the inexistence of some clear rules made 
                                                            
38 PV nº 248 (1 June 1983), interview with Dennis Defforey.  
39 LSA nº 779 (21 November 1980) and FBU, annual memoires PRYCA Supermarkets (1964‐ 1967).  
40 LSA nº 1236 (20 December 1990): Interview with Alfonso Merry del Val, Director General of Promodès 
España.  
41 LSA nº 1087 (23 October 1987): Interview with Alfonso Merry del Val. 
42 LSA nº 753 (11 April 1980). 
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access difficult). These circumstances set certain differences with other cases in Europe 
(see Morris 1999, Shaw, Alexander et al. 2000). On the other hand, the movement of 
capital between France and Spain was affected by the regulatory conditions of the 
country of origin. In fact in 1973, the Loi Royer [Royer Act] was promulgated in France 
(17 December) with the aid to put a halt to the expansion of hypermarkets and protect 
traditional commerce. This was one of the reasons for the international exit of the greats 
of French distribution (Castro 2010).43  Consequently, this first stage of the FDI in 
Spain had substantial importance on the regulatory conditions on both sides of the 
investment movement (see Klopstock 1973, Cho 1985). These diverging conditions 
(regulatory excess in France and by default in this first stage in Spain) had fed the 
receptivity of the Spanish market just as (Tschoegl 1987) mentioned, that is they 
favoured their level of opening up to French capital. A final aspect to consider is the 
premature aspect of this movement, which was ahead of what was usually called second 
globalisation. Factors of proximity, prior knowledge of the market and regulatory 
pressure meant that French investment was ahead of the rest of international investment 
in Spanish retail.  
 
4. Global models and growth from the 1980s to the new century 
The arrival of French hypermarkets had meant a strong and salutary lesson for Spanish 
distribution which accelerated its modernisation. Between 1980 and 1981, Spanish 
capital entered as did a new French competitor in the sector of hypermarkets. In October 
1980, the first Hipercor was inaugurated in Seville, promoted by El Corte Inglés, the 
Spanish chain of department stores which was founded in 1940. Likewise the Basque 
cooperative group Eroski (created in 1969), started to diversify its activity as a multiple 
retailer, opening its first hypermarket in 1981 in Vitoria (Cuesta Valiño 2005, Maixé-
Altés 2009).  Both collated all the teaching of the French pioneers. Finally in February 
of that same year, Gérard Mulliez’s group created the first Spanish Auchan in the 
industrial area of Utebo in Zaragoza, jumping on the bandwagon as General Motors 
were settling in the region.44 The new establishments hispanicised their banner under 
the name of Alcampo, developing a policy as a family business which was different 
from other competitors: diversification and hispanicisation of the offer (Gobin 2006).45  
                                                            
43 PV, nº 224 (1 December 1981). LSA nº 470 (22 November 1973), interview with J.P. Dollberg. 
44 LSA nº 792 (13 March 1981).  
45 DA nº 199 (October 1992).  
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The panorama of Spanish retail at around the time of Spain’s entry into the EEC 
(January 1986) was quickly changing. As a report of the French embassy in Madrid 
stated, although the Spanish market presented difficulties to French distribution 
companies, Spain’s imminent entry into the EEC would change the rules of the game.46 
To start, the number of competitors increased and the multiple Spanish retailers began 
their regional and extra-regional expansion. The economic growth of the eighties and 
nineties was accompanied by the increase in the urban population and the rate of 
feminine activity which, along with other variables, favoured the spread of modern large 
distribution.47 The powerful development of mass consumption which was generated in 
Spanish economy was not directed exclusively to hypermarkets. The greatest market 
share belonged to the supermarket format. Between 1980 and 1995, they practically 
doubled their sales quotas every five years (Maixé-Altés 2009). This trend was only 
comparable with Italy in the whole of Europe. (See Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Number of establishments in Europe from 1971-2001 
  Self-services    Supermarkets   Hypermarkets  
1971 1976 1971 1976 1990 2001 1971 1976 1990 2001
Germany * 86 398 72 887   2 009 4 484 8 000 9 110  729 693 996 2 370
Austria 6 924 8 889 - 229 - 6 727 - 21 - 296
Belgium  3 047 3 839 455 712 1 919 1 985 31 72 100 81
Denmark  804 1 054 280 559 944 1 375 - 17 49 98
Spain  4 638 8 725 138 313 2 500 10 323 - 5 102 314
France 21 727 25 243 1 444 2 876 7 050 5 412 115 305 849 1 197
UK  - 26 114 - 5 890 1 950 6 232 - 124 644 345
Holland 8 672 8 390 520 1 417 2 050 4 257 14 29 40 52
Italy 1 490 19 825 532 945 3 370 10 512 - 9 103 555
Norway  - 5 923 300 545 - - - 29 - - 
Sweden  8 542 7 851   1 238 1 442 - 3 305  15 35 - 90
Source: general report on domestic commerce in Spain, Ministry of Commerce and Tourism, IRESCO, 
August1978 (Statistical annexe nº 35). Eurostat (1993). Euromonitor (2002) 
* Federal Germany before 1990 
 
The arrival of European Economic Space determined a new stage of growth which 
demanded new capital for financing expansion. In the case of PRYCA and Promodès, 
their source of financing was their entrance onto the stock exchange. Alcampo did not 
resort to the stock exchange, being influenced by its corporate culture. The Auchan 
group took advantage of the current which was generating the opening of the new 
                                                            
46 La Documentation Française, Dossier Espagne‐ Grande Distribution (ES/L/0049): “Analyse de la 
distribution espagnole en 1985”.[Analysis of Spanish distribution in 1985] 
47 Instituto Nacional de Estadística, [National Institute of Statistics] 1986‐1996. 
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shopping centres, the third generation of commercial centres, to become one of the main 
instigators of the arrival of category killers in Spain (Leroy Merlin, Decathlon).48 The 
new formats, accompanied by new plans of urbanism, were part of extensive processes 
of diversification.  
In 1994, a new exogenous factor, attributed to the FDI, changed the corporate 
method: the arrival of the German hard-discount. Between 1994 and 1995, the German 
groups Tengelmann (Plus Supermarket), Lidl and Rewe (Penny Market) disembarked in 
Spain, all with a powerful growth strategy which impacted the structural collapse of the 
Spanish market, which, from the appearance of modern formats, had not cultivated the 
hard-discount.49 Lidl was the most active group; in under two years it installed over 200 
establishments. Tengelman followed with over 80 in the same period. From here on, 
this extended like an oil slick. (Cuesta Valiño 2005). 
Although the penetration of the new format in the market was not as revolutionary 
as its competitors had anticipated, it certainly whet the interest of traditional business 
and trade50. For the very first time, the Spanish market started to show signs of 
saturation. On one hand, the retail market incorporated increasingly global competitors 
and on the other, the regulatory frame became more restrictive.  
Due to the growing pressure of traditional commerce, (especially in Catalonia), a 
national Act was passed which regulated retail trade (Act 7/1996, 15 January), similar to 
the French Royer Act of 1973. Alongside this Act, Organic Act 2/1996 came into force, 
largely maintaining the tradition prior to 1996, which had left the regulation of retail 
trade in the hands of its regional governments in their areas of influence. The result was 
not very homogenous legislation at national market level when compared to the retail 
sector. It implicitly favoured supermarkets as it placed the limit of “large surfaces” at 
2,500 square metres (Table 3). Consequently, the regulatory turnaround which, for the 
first time, set up guidelines on the retail trade, meant that growth strategies in the 
Spanish market were directed towards mergers and acquisitions.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
48 LSA nº 1325 (5 November 1992).  
49 El País (29 September 2005), special German distribution. 
50 Interview with Javier Campo, Madrid, 25 March 2010. Javier Campo was the Director General of DIA 
from 1985 to 2007. 
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Table 4. Corporate movements of the eight large distribution companies in Spain, 1996-2002.  
Sources: Personally taken from LSA, PV and DA (various editions) and Cuesta Valiño (2005).  
* Invoicing estimated for the cases of total absorption by the company  
** Includes supermarkets in service stations (REPSOL) 
Table 4 shows the force of the movements of concentration in the sector of 
distribution. Just like what was happening in other sectors of Spanish economic activity, 
commercial distribution companies’ response to the changes in the markets was directed 
towards a larger strategy. This increase was characterised by a greater recourse to 
external means of growth (Cruz Roche 1999, 44). In 1992, the first thousand companies 
invoiced almost 24,000 million euros. Five years later this invoicing volume was in the 
hands of the top 25 companies of the sector. However, concentration had still not yet 
reached the levels of 2005, a year when 66.1 per cent of invoicing was controlled by 
eleven distribution groups or, in other words, five companies controlled half of the 
Main company  Invoicing 
(millions €)* 
Number of 
businesses 
affected  
Businesses affected  
CARREFOUR 7 821.0 656 SIMAGO, Ecovol, Pryca, Continente and 
Promodès. Super Descuento (Dairy Farm), 
Superstop. Supermercados Super-Maxor 
(Comptoirs Modernes). 
MERCADONA 139.5 110 Superama,  Almacenes Paquer,  Supermercats 
Vilaró, Almacenes Gómez Serrano, Covalco 
EROSKI 829.6 476 Syp, Vegonsa, S. de la Fuente, Unide, Cenco, 
Aundía, Disbor, Bide Onera, SA Supera (Unide), 
Carrefour (Terrassa, S. Cugat, Ageciras, 
Cartagena, Murcia, Badajoz, Palencia, 
Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya) 
ALCAMPO 586.2 98 Sabeco, Pao de Açucar, Docks de France, 
Jumbo, Expreso y Carrefour. Soc. Hispánica de 
Desarrollo, Carrefour (Madrid, Barcelona) 
AHOLD 531.2 633 Dialco, Dumaya, Longinos Velasco, 
Supermercados Guerrero, Kampio Market, Punta 
de la Plata, Las Postas de Calahonda, Nieves y 
Trassiera, J. Hidalgo, Superdiplo (Grupo), Seyca 
SA, Mantequerias Varela, Kampio, Cementro Sl, 
Saunisa-Uniford, Cemetro, Majusa, Saunisa-
Unifor, Comercial Ecomar, Castillo del Barrio 
EL CORTE 
INGLES - 
HIPERCOR 
NA ** 21 
hypermarkets 
Supercor, Carrefour (Aviles, Burgos, Valladolid, 
Sevilla, Málaga, Cordoba, Oviedo), Marks and 
Spencer 
CAPRABO 197.8 217 Supermercados Gigante, J. Verdés, Alfaro, 
Pedro Ramon, Cooperativa 70, Enaco, Hnos. 
Jorro, Tengelman, Miquel-Superavui, Miquel-
Zero, Santarem, Super Volcan, Alonso Alarcon, 
Unidiez, Zaralbir 
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market.51 On the other hand, in those years when the number of Spanish companies 
amongst the large ones was falling, French distribution continued to have a huge 
weight, not just in Spain but also in Europe. Nor was the access of new multinationals 
(such as Leader Price and Royal Ahold) into the Spanish market by any means 
negligible. However, the processes of concentration were more advanced in Europe. 
Without doubt, one of the most significant ones with repercussions in Spain was the 
Carrefour-Promodès merger in 1999. Corporate movements in Great Britain, Germany, 
Switzerland and the Netherlands resulted in lost positioning in the ranking of some 
Spanish companies.52  
The widening and extension of markets and the evolution of food consumption had 
profound implications on the structure of the chains of distribution at the end of the 
century53. The factors which contributed to this evolution were the rise of concentration 
and business internationalisation, the increase of horizontal competition and finally the 
rise of vertical competition. The first aspect caused the disappearance of most 
traditional food wholesalers as a consequence of the integration of wholesale functions 
in retail companies. Secondly, the development of horizontal competition occurred as a 
result of a business policy which had more impact on the differentiation of services than 
on the final price. Finally, vertical competition had continued to grow in the 
intermediary distribution markets where large-sized distributers had a high negotiation 
power towards manufacturers and suppliers54.  
All in all, it was the process of concentration which stood out most in this final 
period of Spanish food distribution before the recession of 2008. If we analyse the 
concentration of packaged product distribution using Nielsen’s all commodities value 
(ACV), we get interesting results (see Figure 2)55. This data highlights the notable 
growth of concentration, duplicating the concentration rate both for the fourth and the 
eighth largest distribution companies. In a certain way, Spain was close to the European 
average, although it continued to show strong disparity in this sense as in 2001 the 
                                                            
51 LSA, PV and DA (various editions). 
52 AD, various editions.  
53 For commercial distribution, increasing demand in the last years of the decade of the nineties meant 
repositioning on the part of its ranges, basically products with greater added value and increased extra 
domestic  spending  on  food  (hotel  trade,  the  restaurant  industry  and  institutions),  from  Estadística 
Agroalimentaria,  Madrid,  Ministerio  de  Agricultura,  Pesca  y  Alimentación,  1995‐2006  [Food  and 
Agriculture Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture, Fishing and Food]. 
54 Méndez y Ouviña, 2002. 
55Fresh  food products are excluded  in  this analysis, although  in general  lines  the participation of  the 
different  formats  in  this  sub‐sector  underwent  an  evolution  which  was  relatively  similar  to  that  of 
packaged products (Cruz Roche et al., 2003). 
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concentration in the ACV market in Spain was 45.6 per cent (three large distribution 
companies), which placed it in front of Italy and Greece and behind Portugal, Ireland, 
Germany and the United Kingdom with a quota between 55 and 50 per cent. Sweden 
led with 95 per cent concentration56. 
Figure 2. Evolution of business concentration in the ACV market of high consumer 
products in Spain, 1991-2001 
 
Note: ACV, all commodity value. CR4 and CR8 are concentration ratios, the fourth and eighth largest 
companies in the sector respectively.  
Source: Nielsen. 
Companies’ policies differed from one another. However the backdrop was the 
depletion of a model based on the hypermarket. The most notorious case is that of 
Mercadona, the Valencian chain of supermarkets (Roig’s family firm), which started its 
expansion at the end of the eighties. Favoured by the new legislation, it expanded 
throughout the whole of Spain until it became first in the supermarket sector, ahead of 
the large French chains and Eroski. This company developed an internal growth policy 
based on the opening of new establishments (it invested in large supermarkets and 
disinvested in hypermarkets) and also implemented a discount strategy with its own 
brands, good image, market knowledge and extreme control over its suppliers (Ton, 
Harrow 2012, Audicana Arcas 2002). However, other companies such as the Dutch 
Ahold, followed a very aggressive external growth policy, buying chains of 
establishments with high local implementation. In turn, the cooperative group Eroski 
had a growth strategy which combined internal and external growth via a policy of 
alliances with regional supermarket chains (Grandío, Maixé Altés 2008). Mercadona’s 
progression impacted on Carrefour and Alcampo. Both groups imitated some strategies 
                                                            
56 Nielsen directory. 
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of the native competition: they diversified and deepened their relationships with 
suppliers.  
The concentration of commercial retail distribution was also protected by certain 
wholesale functions. Large retail companies followed two differentiated strategies on 
this matter. Multinationals such as Carrefour and Auchan, whose base was the 
hypermarket, integrated the functions of wholesalers, creating specialised companies 
which guaranteed supply at European level (for example, fresh fruit and vegetable 
products). Other companies (especially leaders in the supermarket sector) created 
“purchasing centres”. Thus purchases of companies associated to the centre were 
unified and other flows of communication (transport, warehousing and payment) were 
managed. Finally, there were only two independent purchasing centres: IFA and 
Euromadi.  
Another factor of globalisation comes from the supranational character of European 
purchasing centres (Copernic, ALIDIS, Carrefour, Metro, Tesco, Schwartz Group, 
Auchan, IRTS and Ahold). The two leading centres, Coopernic and ALIDIS, with over 
100 and 80 million euros invoiced respectively in 2007,57 were alliances which were 
conceived in the middle of the first decade of the present century. Coopernic, with its 
headquarters in Brussels, is a group of groups. It was created in 2006, joined to five 
large independent distributors of European food, four of these companies being 
cooperative companies which represent small retail organisations58. In turn, ALIDIS, 
the alliance formed by the Spanish cooperative Eroski, the French group Les 
Mousquetaires and Edeka (Germany), acted as a European purchasing centre. These 
new centres were constituted vertically and enjoyed autonomy in their procurement 
decisions from members of the alliance.  
Therefore Spanish distribution does not escape the two phenomena which most 
affect Western economies: concentration and globalisation. Although we have to insist, 
there is still a long way to go both in terms of concentration and in the access to external 
markets, Spanish companies have only made relative advances. Spanish companies do 
not seem to opt for internationalisation. Only the Corte Inglés sketched out an entrance 
process in Portugal and Eroski in France when in 2006 it already had 4 hypermarkets, 
18 supermarkets and 17 petrol stations (and that very year it invested 14 million euros in 
                                                            
57 Nielsen and Alimarket. 
58 The Alliance is made up 
e of Colruyt, Belgium; CONAD, Italy; Coop, Switzerland; E. Leclerc, France and REWE Group, Germany.  
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a new hypermarket). Although in this case, the entry into the French market is the result 
of its intervention in a French cooperative in trouble, without having had protection. In 
turn the Galician Gadis and Froiz took advantage of the proximity and natural bias of 
Galicia towards the northern region of Portugal to start their penetration in this market. 
Mercadona and Coviran also showed a similar interest.59 In this sense, the 
internationalisation of the food distribution companies were not as clear as in textiles 
where Spanish firms such as Inditex, Cortefiel or Mango managed to situate themselves 
in the main European cities. Without a doubt, the paradigmatic case is the expansion of 
the Galician Inditex over five continents.  
 
5. Conclusions  
Studying the Spanish market over its fifty year history has provided a solvent 
framework for seeking factors which have contributed to the structural change in food 
trade markets in peripheral Europe. Moreover, this had led to inedited factors which 
contributed to better understanding the processes of sectorial modernisation on the 
entire continent. The starting hypothesis is based on the fact that the modernisation of 
the sector was done in terms of appropriation (organisational and technological) of 
foreign innovations. This implies the progressive participation of native agents in the 
diffusion processes of these innovations. The introduction of these factors of 
modernisation in backwards peripheral markets sustained itself on three pillars: the 
economic frame, the institutional framework and the foreign influence. These are the 
factors which permitted varying the receptivity of Spanish food distribution (that is, its 
level of opening as a recipient economy). 
The most obvious factor is the actual evolution of the Spanish economy. The 
moments of greater expansion were accompanied by a growth in income per capita. 
These conditions favoured the expansion of the country’s commercial fabric in volume 
and diversity. In fact, until the “economic miracle” of the sixties, self-services did not 
come about in Spanish cities. Likewise, it was the entry into the EEC which favoured 
the development of French hypermarkets on Spanish ground and their evolution towards 
retail parks.  
The institutional framework and foreign influence played a role which amplified or 
reduced the effects of economic growth on Spanish distribution. Sometimes they acted 
                                                            
59 Alimarket and AD, various editions. 
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as rivals and others, were complementary, depending on the political and economic 
circumstances. The state supplied or put a brake on the permeability to foreign currents 
in the different situations, creating favourable institutions in the first case or 
accentuating their interventionist policies in the second.  
The subjects which have been put forward suggest that the institutional framework 
was more of a hindrance than a stimulus in the modernisation of the sector. Foreign 
influence was a form of modernisation which underwent a serious impact due to the 
third protagonist of this history. Very soon, foreign agents, who were not always 
investors, ended up being attracted by a market of over thirty million similar consumers 
in cultural terms. From the sixties, companies such as SPAR or SIMAGO, at the 
beginning or Carrefour and Continente, later on, positioned themselves for the Spanish 
market. The market was less docile than estimated by foreign agents, both due to the 
presence of archaic commercial structures and native competition. Foreign presence 
grew at the same time as the Spanish market. Progressively more capital was 
incorporated, starting from its testimonial presence in the sixties and seventies until the 
large scale arrival at the end of the century.  
This paper shows that foreign companies were the first vehicle of modernisation of 
Spanish commercial structures. Moreover they favoured the later insertion of these 
structures in a global market (in logistical rather than commercial terms). Spanish 
competition learned from these foreign influences, and even surpassed them although 
Spanish food retailing had still not considered internationalisation as a viable strategy.  
From a theoretical point of view, the market receptivity of peripheral countries with 
a traditional commercial framework is inversely proportional to the development of 
local competitors. In fact, despite the fact that the institutional framework did not 
always help Spanish commercial development, the FDI certainly did not seem to have 
problems settling in the country. However, once local competition developed, the 
market widened and competition grew. The case of Mercadona, whose growth was due 
to the legislation in the mid nineties, is probably the most significant. Additionally, we 
had verified theories on the modernisation of the commercial framework via 
appropriation. The Spanish case, comparable to other cases of peripheral Mediterranean 
countries, is an example of how the host country “borrowed” these influences and made 
them its own, creating hybrids which are more suitable to its own market. The cases of 
small chains such as DIA or Mercadona are paradigmatic. 
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The deep and enhanced outline presented here can help us learn about the 
endogenous and exogenous processes which contributed to the modernisation of food 
distribution in Mediterranean Europe. The comparative analysis of other countries like 
Italy whose food distribution also took a while to modernise itself or processes which 
were even more behind like the Portuguese or Greek, can provide more conclusions.  
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